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H istorically Indinn and Afghan lemlerscnjoycd extremely close re la-
tions, before and afterthc end of 
British colonial nlle in South Asia. 
Due IQ the fri endship with the 
Soviet Union, Indiawasoneof the 
first nOIHligncd stmes to recog-
nise the communist regime 
installed after the invasion of the 
Red Army in 1979. The Indinns 
also appeared vcry keen to sup-
port ~ucccssive Afghan govern-
ments in order nOt 10 loS(' llullU-
al economic and I)Ol itic;)l tics. 
lIowc\'o:: r. with the Talibtm's 
assumption of power in the 1990s. 
whid, had close tics to Indja'~ arch 
rival Jl;;Jkistnn, the country was 
!\Ir1lcd into a hub for ami-Indian 
militant activities , thus leading 10 
the dctcriormion of India-
Afghanistan rci;uions. Sincc the 
last decade. the Indian govern-
ment has Uc.:n trying!O rc-cswb-
!ish its prc-TaliLwn rclmionshill. 
Therefore. Indin restored full 
diplommi~ relwions and ~'Stab­
lisll(:d aJll1nUS11<1Ily 1~I1,'I) cor1S111(lr 
service across Afghwliswn fol-
low~-d by eXlellsive d~'Velopnlcnl 
assisrance. India w~s not news-
Sllrily enC01Intg~-d by the intcnt(l-
tion~1 community in Ihis endeav-
our. Especially the US was afmid 
that an y lllt husiasl nand appl'Q'.w 
for India's (lCIivilies inMghanistan 
would provoke ils major (lily 
1~lkist~n, onc of the h,),-a(;toN in 
AfglmnistHn. Iluwever, most 
importillllly, India's engagement 
w~s f;lVour~d and endorsed by 
nHmy Mghan 1~3ders who were 
lodu(;at~d in Indian universitiL'S 
3nd still had greHt atfectiun for 
their host wuntry. l'urthcnnore. 
India is still benefitling from its 
fonner support for the vi(;torious 
NorthemAlliancewhich was able 
fO include many of their leaders 
in the current b'O\~rnmem. Since 
the owrthruwofthe TWilxullndiH 
llils emerged as a major actur in 
the on-going recunstruction 
process uf Afghanist3Jl. In orUer 
to renew its tics with the L'Ounty. 
India has plL-dgt.-d twu billion US 
dollar IImi! 2014 in development 
<tid, making it tu one ufthe most 
significam dunor L'Ountries. Today 
• 
erl 
I nd i~'s assistance more or less cov-
CN all kinds of civilian aid, includ-
ing infms1nl~t ure, agri~ulture, 
t m nsportat ion, COl nm u ni~atio ns, 
trade, investmem, mining. edu-
calion elc. In contrnst wilh 
USINATOllSAF activities India 
has been foc1lsing olllow-visibil-
ity projects. It has emphasised 
from the sta l'l the need for coor-
dination wilh local authori fies to 
enhance Iheir ownership. As n 
resu lt Indians haVCg<lined much 
l'St~'(!m ;lInongAfghans as a CI'(.'(t-
ible lInd reliable pnrt ne r. Since 
2011 NI.JW t)l!Uli has IX,:n increas-
ing its engagemCnt wilh 
Afghanistall in securi ty related 
areas. For el«lmple India was ,lIId 
still is the only country to ,-'vcr ~ign 
a defence or iented Smuegic 
Partnership Agreemcnt wilh 
Afghaniswn. Consequcntly the 
strategiC thinkers in Iran and 
P(lkist:ln becnme increasingly 
worril'd (IOOut Ihe re;ll implica-
tions for New Lldll!'s engal,'(:llIent 
in Afghani ,tan. Generally Olle ~all 
identify following selS of Indiml 
illl~'reSIS: Firsl . tlll'f'CMC t'COI1()lllic 
intcn.:sts. Afghanistan is nOl only 
seen (I IlIanufaClU ring hub. pro-
viding !I1u ~h needed rl'Sources 
such as minerals. but also as a 
pOlendal market for Indian prod-
\I~ts. Sc~ond. Ihe atlaiml1el1\ of 
l'11lTgY St'CUr1ty n.;'quircd to n.:dllCC 
IndiH's dependcll(;e on energy 
suWlies from the Middle E<tst. 
Third, 10 ensure Indi~'s own 
natiunal security through hin· 
dering a rctUnl of an extremist , 
lIIilit3Jlt Talibilll rl'gimc in Kab ul: 
this i nclu des cu n<tiling thc spread 
of ~rms· and drugs-trafficking. 
Forth, from a geustr~tegic per· 
spectivc, Afghanistan is seen as a 
corridur and hub for tTilde and 
tr.msit. ;IS a gatew3r to and from 
South and Central Asia. to large 
l'Xfent gr.iIlting ;1L'(;ess into West 
Asia, Russia and even Europe. Iklt 
lx.'Sides these fatton;. there is no 
duubl th,lt Afghanistan is alsu 
identified as a significant b't-'UPU-
Iitical constraint un PakiStHn. In 
this cuntexl. some analysts arc 
convincl.-d that New Delhi is very 
eager to secure and expand its 
illleresls in Afgh;mis[(ln 'by all 
means'. This includes lhe estab-
lishment of a pro-Indian regime 
in Kabul as well as gaining reli-
able allies in Afglmnislan's neigh-
bourhood. Or at least guanU1lCe-
ing that regional actors Slay neu-
tml in New Delhi's rivalry with 
Islamabad. To sum up, India's 
most fundamental imercst lies in 
actively promoting political and 
economical slitbility in a region-
ally imcsrated Afghanistan, while 
at the same time pM~ntingcxter­
nal influcnce in domcstic politi-
cal dl'Vt'lopmentS. IlQI.vever, sinC\) 
achieving this S1r(II~'gi~ ponfolio 
as well as safegu(uding India's 
developmentHI progress is 
Ix.'colll ing increasingl)' difficu lt . 
the debille of a military cnga{,'c-
mcnt ,ullong New Delhi security 
circles is gaining momentum. 
Ncvcnhek'SS. India should nOt 
be 10 "fill the .LI 
a majur military commitment 
which wuuld inC\itably arise after 
foreign furces le,IVC Afglmnislan 
in 201 4.111ere aw H cuupleof rea-
sons s to funtx.'f deepen this point. 
First, besides the I'I,LCmergellce 
of the 1'3kistall f3clOr and fhe 
THliban in Afghan politics, the 
unfavourable US-I'akist;m 
alli31lce, l'aslnun indifference 
towards India, (Uld the geogrJph-
icallimitations. dlNC is (Ill inoo-
heTCm policy and cunfusion 
3J11UI18 NA'IUIISAF states about 
how to deal with Indi~'s invulve-
mem in Afghanistan. Many of 
thl'llI sec any lndi~n rule still as 
fO comTOversial and stick with 
l~lkist3Jl as the supreme parOler 
in urUenu achil've peal'C and sta-
bility in Afghanistan. It is also not 
sure how the diffe rel1l elhnic 
groups especiall)' the non-
Pashtuns wilt rea ~t when a 
'I'ashtun-Taliban conglomerate' 
(rclgains power in Kabul. Having 
this in mind, one has 10 raise the 
question if the Afghan sceuri ly 
forces will es tablish themse lvcs 
I 
" war after20 14 in which India will 
im.'versibly Oe dr<1l\11 in. 
&'<:ond, Mghans might show 
dCCI) affection towards India ,Llld 
, I 
ofitsdl'I'Clopmel1t pru;t.'t:t:s which 
would incwasingly lx.>coll1e the 
anti · lndi~n a~1ivities. 
Tu sum up, Afghanist3J1 is often 
seen as a tlost ruse for India's fur-
eign poli,-")', its grO\ving regiunal 
3nd glob31 prominence, and 
especially fo r its hegemonic 
aspimlions. 
But crilics haw to unuerst3Jld 
dial the nl'\.-d for engagelllem in 
Afglmnistan is not just 3n expres-
sion of India's inten lation;li am bi-
lions as a rising power. Instead it 
must be acknO\~1edb'\.-d fh~t this 
is a legitimate mHtter of national 
defence imerpreted as regional 
security and sl3bility. It is \\ith-
OUl any doubf ,liso a question of 
securing straightforward eco-
aomic interests. TIlCfCfore, India's 
role is not directed against the sta-
bilit)' and sovereigllty of any stme 
in I he region. In light of the Soviet 
and the US/lSAI' e~perien~es, 
de~i s ion makers in New Delhi 
have 10 understand thal any 
robust military engagement in 
Afghanistan appears unsustain-
able and unwinnable: Ihis is 
unlike ly to be ~ny di fferent for 
India. 
11lcrdore. a military interven-
tion would lead in the wrong 
din..'(;tion.lndia nt'Cds to contin-
ue and intens ify its successful 
multi-sec toral. soft · power 
approach and to envis.1ge dl'(!P-
(.'1' eng;tgement in areas like St,<:u-
ri ty sector 1'1, "form. l'SI)t.'(;iall y civi 1-
mi!i!(1ry rcl,uions and police 
reform as well (IS building civil-
society cal,,1citics. 110w\,'Ver. SIIP-
]lordll!; the Afghall CCOtlomy and 
ensuring th(l1 thc government is 
able to gain sufficielll n..'VCI1UC'S in 
ordl'r to nmilllain its level of StUL-
rity for~es. including adequate 
remuneration in order to ke<:p 
them 10YHI, remAins the mOSt 
imporlHnt lIIosa i ~ in India's 
~llgagclllell\ itl flfgl~1nistan. Froln 
Ihis perspcctive, India will h~vc 
10 Illake diffiClllt C llOic~'S between 
'soft Ilower' And ' hard power' 
[including the military oluion I. 
whelhcr to ignore or take into 
account Pakistan's intewsts 3nd 
SI.'t;uri ty l'Olll'Cms in Afghanistan. 
how to positiun itself in the Iml1-
US cunt1i'-1, and last but nOlleast 
how to de~1 with Olitm's grO\ving 
a'-1:ivities in Afghanistan. 'lb con-
dude, l'ven thouglllndia's is not 
Ill'Cessarily caught up in 3 catch· 
22 situ3tion in Afghanist3n , the 
success and prospects of its 
eng;lb'CtIlent remain uncen~in. 
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